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Scottish sources suggest that the Scottish king, Robert I, left instructions 
to his commanders on his deathbed for how war with England should 
be fought in the years to follow. Although it is unclear as to whether this 
“testament” was based on any sort of reality, or was simply a literary cre-
ation of later years, it is referred to commonly in Scottish historiography 
as something of a manual for the Scots, based upon the lessons learned 
by their warrior king. In the years after Robert I’s death, however, the 
Scots lost three battles in fourteen years, and would go on to lose more 
examples in the decades to follow. Historians of medieval Scotland have, 
therefore, deduced that those Scottish military leaders who had gath-
ered around their king’s deathbed either ignored or forgot the advice of 
their king. This article aims to challenge this dominant historiographi-
cal view of the military history of this period of conflict, with particular 
focus given to the Second Scottish War of Independence (1332–1357). 
It will reconsider the extent to which the Scots adhered to the testament 
of “Good King Robert”, and the degree to which they continued the type 
of war that their king had fought during his own time. It will re-examine 
the main battles of this second conflict with England and re-assess the 
extent to which the results of these set pieces should be seen as the dom-
inant factors in relation to this period of war. Ultimately, this article will 
reconsider the extent to which lessons were indeed learned by Scottish 
commanders during the Second War of Independence, and the degree 
to which Scottish commanders, rather than abandoning hard-learned 
past lessons, instead prosecuted a style of war that aligned closely with 
the warfare advocated by Robert I. 
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According to some manuscript copies of a medieval Scottish chroni-
cle, Robert I, the king who had led Scotland to freedom from English 
domination during the First Scottish War of Independence (1296–1328), 
called his nobles to his deathbed in his final days.1 Here he supposedly 
presented to them his testament. This was a set of instructions to his com-
manders, and to those who would tutor the king’s young successor, David 
II. They included lessons learned by the king himself on how to best fight 
the English foe. Included in this testament was military advice of a type 
that aligned with the style of war the king had prosecuted during his own 
reign, and with which he had ultimately been successful. As it is reported 
in verse form:
On foot should be all Scottish war
Let hill and marsh their foes debar
And woods as walls prove such an arm
That enemies do them no harm.
In hidden spots keep every store
And burn the plainlands them before
So, when they find the land lie waste
Needs must they pass away in haste
Harried by cunning raids at night
And threatening sounds from every height.
Then, as they leave, with great array
Smite with the sword and chase away.
This is the counsel and intent
Of Good King Robert’s Testament.2
1 Johannis de Fordun Scotichronicon cum Supplementis et Continuatione Walteri Boweri, ed. 
W. Goodall, 2 vols (Edinburgh: Robert Fleming, 1759), ii, 232; see also Walter Bower, Scotichro-
nicon, ed. D.E.R. Watt et al, 9 vols (Edinburgh: Mercat Press, 1993–1998), ix, 37. The earliest 
accounts of the king’s deathbed scene suggest no last-minute instruction to his men about 
fighting the future war. Instead, the accounts focus on Bruce’s determination to secure the 
safety of his soul, and for his nobles to choose one from among them who would take the king’s 
heart on crusade (John Barbour, The Bruce, ed. A.A.M. Duncan (Edinburgh: Canongate, 1997), 
748–754; The True Chronicles of Jean le Bel, 1290–1360, trans. N. Bryant (Woodbridge: Boydell 
Press, 2011), 52–53).
2 Colm McNamee, Robert Bruce: Our Most Valiant Prince, King and Lord (Edinburgh: Birlinn, 
2012), 299. The earliest version of this military strategy may come from a now-lost chronicle 
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Robert I’s advice was, then, to continue the guerrilla tactics that had effec-
tively denied English forces an outright conquest of Scotland, and which 
had been used in turn to transform a largely defensive form of war into 
an offensive one, with violent raids unleashed against English interests 
and possessions.3 Perhaps implicit within such advice was a suggestion 
that the Scots should avoid facing the English in battle at all. Although 
this is not stated explicitly in the earliest iteration of this tale, it was devel-
oped in sixteenth-century retelling of the episode to form one of the key 
statements of supposed Scottish medieval military policy. For example, 
George Buchanan wrote that the Scots should,
never…bring their whole force against the English at once, nor risk their 
fortune on the issue of one battle…the English, who inhabit a better 
country than the Scots, exceed them in the number of men, in money, 
and, in fine, in all the materiel of war, and, therefore, on account of 
these advantages, are more accustomed to ease, and more impatient of 
fatigue; but the Scots, nurtured in a sterner soil, are by their parsimony 
and constant exercise rendered more healthy, and by the nature of their 
education better fitted to undergo military toil, and, therefore, better 
adapted for irregular skirmishes, wearing out the enemy by degrees, and 
breaking them by occasional attacks, than for meeting them at once in 
a pitched battle.4
from the period just after Robert I’s reign, written by Bernard of Arbroath, chancellor of Scot-
land (see Chron. Bower, vi, 321, xvii-xviii; Michael Penman, Robert the Bruce: King of the Scots 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 118). The interpolation of this chronicle fragment 
into Bower’s fifteenth-century Scotichronicon makes no reference to this being part of a kingly 
deathbed instruction. Indeed, a similar description of Scottish tactics, again without reference 
to a deathbed testament, is also made in Jean Froissart’s Chroniques, written in the last decades 
of the fourteenth century. Here the basic tenets of Scottish military strategy are discussed in 
relation to the events after the battle of Halidon Hill (1333) (The Wars of Edward III: Sources 
and Interpretations, ed. Clifford J. Rogers (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1999), 40–41).  
3 For Bruce’s military career, see for example Michael Brown, Bannockburn: The Scottish War 
and the British Isles, 1307–1323 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008), 93–103. 
4 George Buchanan, The History of Scotland, trans. J. Aikman, 4 vols (Glasgow and Edin-
burgh: Blackie, Fullarton & Co., 1827–1829), i, 444–445.
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Other accounts from the same period would further develop these points 
and similarly stress the importance of battle-avoidance when it came to 
fighting the English.5
Importantly, however, such declarations insisting that facing the Eng-
lish in battle should be avoided came from a period in which the Scots had 
indeed faced their enemy several times, and lost on almost every occa-
sion. In particular, the sixteenth-century Scottish disasters at Flodden 
(1513), Solway Moss (1542) and Pinkie (1547) provided all the examples 
that contemporary writers undoubtedly needed to stress this particular 
facet of military strategy.6 As such, it is little surprise that these writers 
placed within Robert Bruce’s last words an instruction to avoid the battle-
field catastrophes that they knew followed the king’s reign. However, as 
indicated above, this statement is a later addition. While the Scots are 
encouraged to attack the English through “cunning raids at night,” and to 
“smite with the sword and chase away” the enemy upon their retreat, the 
original account of “Good King Robert’s Testament” makes no explicit 
comment on the importance of battle-avoidance to Scottish strategy. 
Despite this, historians continue to emphasise the importance of battles, 
and in particular of battlefield defeat, in their analyses of fourteenth-cen-
tury Scottish warfare.7 In part this is because some fourteenth- and early 
fifteenth-century examples, such as the battles of Dupplin Moor (1332), 
5 The Chronicles of Scotland Compiled by Hector Boece, translated into Scots by John Bellen-
den, 1531, 2 vols (Edinburgh: Scottish Text Society, 1938–1941), ii, 291–292; Leslie’s History of 
Scotland, ed. E.G. Cody, 4 vols (Edinburgh: Scottish Text Society, 1884–1895), ii, 12–13; John 
Major, A History of Greater Britain (Edinburgh: Scottish History Society, 1982), 264–265.
6 For discussion of all three battles, and this period of sixteenth-century conflict more widely, 
see Gervase Phillips, The Anglo–Scots Wars, 1513–1550: A Military History (Woodbridge: Boy-
dell Press, 1999).
7 For example, see Alexander Grant, “Disaster at Neville’s Cross: The Scottish point of view,” – 
The Battle of Neville’s Cross, 1346, ed. D. Rollason and M. Prestwich (Stamford: Shaun Tyas, 
1998), 15–35; Alastair J. Macdonald, “Triumph and Disaster: Scottish Military Leadership in 
the Middle Ages,” – Scotland and England at War, c.1296–c.1513, ed. A. King and D. Simp-
kin (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 255–282; Michael A. Penman, The Scottish Civil War: the Bruces and 
the Balliols and the War for the Control of Scotland, 1286–1356 (Stroud: History Press, 2002), 
129, 131; Michael Brown, The Black Douglases: War and Lordship in Late Medieval Scotland, 
1300–1455 (East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 1998), 149; Kelly DeVries, Infantry Warfare in the 
Early Fourteenth Century (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1996), 177–178; J. Anthony Tuck, “War 
and Society in the Medieval North,” Northern History, 21 (1985): 33–52, at 39.
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Halidon Hill (1333), Neville’s Cross (1346) and Homildon Hill (1402), 
appear to be the examples that prove the rule. These large-scale Scottish 
defeats reinforce the idea that battle-avoidance could have served Scot-
tish forces far better than choosing to face the English on the battlefield. 
And as a result of this view there has developed an overriding perception 
that the period of the Second Scottish War of Independence was solely 
one of Scottish defeat, or at best Scottish survival against the odds. It is 
one of the objects of this article to question this accepted view.
Another reason for the modern historiographical stress on battle-
avoidance relates to the debate currently ongoing regarding the nature of 
medieval strategy and tactics more broadly. A vigorous discussion con-
tinues in which historians have suggested opposing views on the impor-
tance of either battle-seeking or battle-avoidance as the key driver of 
military affairs in the medieval period.8 This historiographical debate has 
also influenced those analysing military activity in fourteenth-century 
Scotland and, while the principal tenets of the wider discussion have not 
been adopted in their entirety, they have helped to reinforce a particu-
lar assumption regarding this period of conflict. This is that the Scottish 
nobles who gathered around the king’s deathbed took apparently little 
regard of their king’s wishes. For the aforementioned battlefield defeats in 
the period up to 1402 appear to act as exemplars of how not to fight the 
English. It is this perceived error of the post-1329 generation of Scottish 
commanders in fighting pitched battles at all that has been a major focus 
of Scottish historians. As Macdonald has argued, the period of the Second 
Scottish War of Independence is seen as one in which there was “[a] most 
radical shift…from highly effective military activity conducted during 
the reign of Robert I to the military disasters that occurred in 1332–1333, 
after his death.”9 Indeed, Macdonald underlines that the commanders of 
this next phase of conflict appear “to have been suddenly incompetent,” 
8 See, for example, Stephen Morillo, “Battle Seeking: The Contexts and Limits of Vegetian 
Strategy,” Journal of Medieval Military History, 1 (2003): 21–41; Clifford J. Rogers, “The Veget-
ian “Science of Warfare” in the Middle Ages,” Journal of Medieval Military History, 1 (2003): 
1–19; John Gillingham, ““Up with Orthodoxy!”: In Defence of Vegetian Warfare,” Journal of 
Medieval Military History, 2 (2004): 149–158.
9 Macdonald, “Triumph and Disaster,” 256.
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and he describes the years of 1332–1333 as “the apogee of apparent Scot-
tish military incompetence.”10 Michael Brown has also argued that only 
by returning to the ideas laid out in “Good King Robert’s Testament,” 
to the policy of deliberate guerrilla warfare, were the Scots able to put 
behind them two years when they “paid a heavy price in defeat.”11 The fact 
that later Scottish nobles failed to take on board the hard lessons learned 
by Robert I has condemned those who led the war effort in the years that 
followed. Little has been attempted, however, to question this accepted 
view of medieval Scottish warfare in the years after Robert I’s death.12 
10 Ibid., 256, 261.
11 Brown, Bannockburn, 93–94.
12 For a detailed reconsideration of this period of conflict, see Iain A. MacInnes, Scotland's 
Second War of Independence, 1332–1357 (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2016).
Statue of Robert the Bruce, King of Scots from 1306 until his death in 1329, 
on the esplanade at Stirling Castle, Scotland, by Andrew Currie. Courtesy 
Pixabay
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Experience, leadership, and the Brucean way of war
To begin, it is worth returning to Robert I’s testament. Although unlikely 
to have been the words of the king himself, the themes addressed in the 
testament nonetheless reflect a logical set of tactics to overcome a more 
numerous, wealthier and better-equipped foe, whether in the fourteenth, 
fifteenth or sixteenth centuries. The strategy provided in the testament 
is given greater potency by the idea that Robert I had himself learned 
these lessons during his own wars as a result of changing tactics follow-
ing his early defeats. For Robert I’s own wartime experience had begun 
inauspiciously when, adopting “conventional” tactics of siege and battle, 
he had been defeated by both the English and by his Scottish enemies, to 
the extent that he was forced to flee the kingdom.13 Following his return 
in 1307, Robert I apparently changed his approach and adopted more 
“unconventional” guerrilla tactics. He attacked castles by stratagem and 
surprise, and destroyed them after their capture to deny their use to the 
enemy. He employed destructive raiding as an offensive weapon of war 
across Scotland, England and Ireland, in an effort to enforce his will on the 
Scottish people, and enforce the reality of his kingship on England. And 
he largely avoided pitched battles with English forces, unless in circum-
stances that suited the Scots.14 This is, then, the standard against which 
later Scottish commanders, their strategy and their tactics, have been 
compared in modern historiography. And looking at the principal war 
years of 1332 to 1338, it would appear that Scottish commanders actually 
did, to a great extent, follow the tactics attributed to Robert I. This should 
not come as any great surprise. Some historians have viewed this second 
phase of the conflict as being led by a new generation of commanders 
whose skills were not up to the task, or who did not have experience of 
the Brucean form of warfare. Macdonald suggests that the years of peace 
between 1327 and 1332 may have “blunted [the] skills to some extent” of 
13 See G.W.S. Barrow, Robert Bruce and the Community of the Realm of Scotland (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2005), 188–212; Michael Brown, The Wars of Scotland, 1214–1371 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004), 197–202.
14 Barrow, Robert Bruce, 213–242; Brown, Wars of Scotland, 202–231; David Cornell, Bannock-
burn: The Triumph of Robert the Bruce (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 152–162.
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Scottish soldiers and commanders.15 He also argues that the new genera-
tion of Scottish commanders “fatally failed [their] test…[because] there 
was no reliable way that battlefield experience could be passed on to inex-
perienced leaders. They would have to learn lessons from scratch, if they 
lived long enough.”16 This is, however, something of an exaggeration. 
There is no doubt that the Scottish military leadership was deprived 
of continuity by the deaths in quick succession of the two most experi-
enced commanders of the previous conflict. Thomas Randolph and James 
Douglas had been Robert I’s most trusted and skilled wartime leaders 
over the course of the preceding war and their loss, in 1330 (Douglas) 
and 1332 (Randolph), undoubtedly created a leadership vacuum for the 
Scottish war effort.17 But beyond these two, the military leadership at the 
commencement of the Second War of Independence was more repre-
sentative of continuity from the previous conflict than has been previ-
ously acknowledged. Many leading figures had participated in the wars 
of Robert I. They had experienced victory and success and would take 
that knowledge into the next conflict. Included amongst their number 
were the two senior military officers of the Scottish crown, the marshal 
Robert Keith, and the constable Gilbert Hay. Both men lived on into the 
period of the second conflict and should have been able to pass on their 
knowledge and experience to newer commanders and to the men who 
fought under them.18 Other figures too had gained battlefield experience, 
were themselves veterans of Bannockburn and other victories, and again 
should have been able to bring their experience to bear in the renewed 
conflict after 1332. These included men such as Earl Malcolm of Len-
nox, Alexander Fraser, Robert Boyd, and Alexander Seton, prominent 
figures within the Scottish military leadership and the heads of militar-
ily active kin groups.19 They represented a potentially quite high degree 
15 Macdonald, “Triumph and Disaster,” 279.
16 Macdonald, “Triumph and Disaster,” 279.
17 No complete account has been written on Randolph’s military career, but for some examples 
of his importance to the Bruce cause in the first war, see Penman, Robert the Bruce, 137–138, 
140–141, 164–174, 235–239. For Douglas, see Brown, Black Douglases, 14–31. 
18 MacInnes, Scotland’s Second War, 138–140.
19 Ibid., 118, 141–142.
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of continuity of military leadership for Scottish forces in war. Indeed, it 
was the deaths of some of these men in the battles of 1332 and 1333 that, 
arguably, diluted the pool of talent available to lead Scottish forces in war 
in later years and forced the demands of leadership on others with less 
experience.20 For this early part of the war, however, Scottish forces were 
not led by inexperienced men with little understanding of how contem-
porary war should be fought. It is worth, then, re-examining the nature 
of Scottish warfare throughout the Second War of Independence, and the 
extent to which it really aligned with the tactics attributed to Robert I’s 
testament. Through such examination it should be possible to reconsider 
the pitched battles of the period and fit these into a more refined picture 
of Brucean warfare across this conflict.
Scotland’s topography
Turning first to the use of topography, there is little doubt that Scot-
tish commanders were able to utilise Scotland’s terrain and turn it into 
one of the kingdom’s greatest assets in the war with England. Firstly, it 
ensured that Scotland, unlike Wales before it, could not be encircled by 
English castles and garrisons and thus controlled in the aftermath of Eng-
lish invasion armies withdrawing south.21 Successive English kings dis-
covered that the geography of Scotland forced them along well-defined 
routes when marching their armies through the kingdom, and that these 
routes were prone to ambush from Scottish forces hidden in areas of 
20 For discussion of the leaders of the Scottish war effort in the period that followed 1333, and 
of the military experience gained by leading Scottish figures more generally, see MacInnes, 
Scotland’s Second War, chapter 4. 
21 Rogers argues that Edward III attempted to pacify Scotland by establishing a “system of 
fortifications similar to the one his grandfather had built in Wales” (Clifford J. Rogers, War 
Cruel and Sharp: English Strategy under Edward III, 1327–1360 (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 
2000), 87). But it is difficult to see how this could have functioned in reality. While Edward III 
did try and establish a system of fortifications to control southern Scotland, this was only ever 
intended to impose English order on that part of Scotland ceded to England by King Edward 
Balliol as recompense for the military aid granted to him by the English king during Balliol’s 
attempts to seize the Scottish throne. 
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wood and bog.22 In the Second War of Independence, when English inva-
sion armies crossed the border successively in the winter of 1334–1335, 
and the summers of 1335, 1336, 1337 and 1338, Scottish command-
ers consistently avoided direct confrontation with the invading enemy. 
Instead, they retreated before the English armies, choosing to pick off 
smaller English bands of raiders and attack the less-protected rear of the 
enemy force, or to launch counter-raids into England following English 
retreat back across the frontier.23 Even in 1333, when the English besieged 
Berwick-upon-Tweed, an action that led to the battle of Halidon Hill, 
the Scots at first attempted to lure English forces away by outflanking 
the besiegers and raiding Northern England. The sight of these north-
ern territories in flames was meant to give the English pause for thought, 
especially as many of those serving within the besieging army were them-
selves northern lords.24 The same tactic had been used by James Douglas 
during the first war, when in 1319 he successfully raided England and 
drew off the besieging forces of Edward II from Berwick as a result.25 That 
the tactic failed to work a second time, in 1333, was down to Edward III’s 
determination to remain, and the stronger control he had over his force 
than had his father previously. Although unsuccessful on this occasion, 
the tactic of withdrawing before an English advance, utilising the topog-
raphy of Scotland to melt away before reappearing elsewhere when least 
expected, was one that the Scots would return to time and again in the 
years that followed. 
A particularly detailed example of this Scottish ability is provided 
by the campaigns of 1336.26 Led by the pre-eminent commander of the 
22 For discussion of invasion routes and the topography of Scotland, see Geoffrey W.S. Bar-
row, “Land Routes: The Medieval Evidence,” – Loads and Roads in Scotland and Beyond: Land 
Transport over 6000 Years, ed. A. Fenton and G. Stell (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1984), 49–66.
23 For a combination of these various tactics in relation to the English invasions of 1337 and 
1338, see MacInnes, Scotland’s Second War, 30–36.
24 Ibid., 14–16; Ranald Nicholson, Edward III and the Scots: The Formative Years of a Military 
Career, 1327 to 1335 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), 119–133.
25 Penman, Robert the Bruce, 207–208.
26 For a detailed account of these campaigns, see Iain A. MacInnes, ““To subject the north of 
the country to his rule”: Edward III and the “Lochindorb chevauchée” of 1336,” Northern Scot-
land, 3 (2012): 16–31; see also Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 115–123.
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period, Andrew Murray, Scottish forces successfully negotiated difficult 
terrain to appear successively where they could do most damage, at least 
cost. During the early weeks of the English invasion, Edward III’s forces 
were attacked at various points as they marched through southern Scot-
land, including ambushes in the “forests and mountains” of the West 
March, and at the key strategic river crossing point at Stirling.27 Later in 
the campaign, while besieging Lochindorb Castle, in northern Scotland, 
Andrew Murray and his troops were forced to withdraw at the approach 
of a small English army under Edward III himself. Successfully avoiding 
a possible attempt by the English king to force them into a confrontation, 
the Scots headed south as Edward III continued his campaign through 
northeast Scotland.28 While Edward III was sacking Aberdeen in the 
Scottish northeast, Andrew Murray appeared in the south, in Lanark-
shire, to recruit forces from his own lands and to foment trouble in areas 
recently converted to English allegiance by the activities of Edward III.29 
In response to Murray’s movements, another English force under John of 
Eltham, the king’s brother, invaded southern Scotland, possibly with the 
intention of forcing a confrontation with Murray, or to drive him back 
north towards the waiting Edward III. Once again Murray was able to 
withdraw from any such confrontation, and made his way back north 
once more, utilising his knowledge of Scottish terrain and topography to 
avoid the army of Edward III as he did so.30 By October, when Edward III 
was at Andrew Murray’s castle of Bothwell repairing its defences, Mur-
ray himself was in the Scottish northeast, systematically devastating the 
lands through which the English king had progressed only two months 
earlier.31 No doubt, this ability to appear where the enemy was not had 
much to do with the smaller forces available to the Scots. Large English 
invasion armies could not move with much speed, nor could they prog-
ress over difficult terrain without leaving baggage trains and supplies 
behind. Even Edward III’s smaller, more mobile force of 1336 struggled at 
27 MacInnes, “Edward III and the Lochindorb chevauchée,” 17.
28 Ibid., 19–20, 23–24.
29 MacInnes, Scotland’s Second War, 27–28. 
30 Ibid., 28–29.
31 bid,, 29.
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various times to locate sufficient food for themselves and fodder for their 
horses.32 Record evidence shows that English knights even learned to take 
smaller horses to Scotland as their large destriers were of little use in the 
Scottish terrain.33 There is, then, little doubt that Scotland’s topography 
played its part. The knowledge and utilisation of Scottish terrain to allow 
the ambush and outflanking of English forces was as important in the 
1330s as it had been during Robert I’s wars. 
The tactics of destruction
In relation to the second point of King Robert’s testament, scorched earth 
tactics, this had been a Scottish policy since before Robert I’s leadership 
in war. Indeed, William Wallace was said to have ordered that the fields 
of southern Scotland be laid waste in 1298 to afford the English armies 
of Edward I nothing with which to sustain them.34 The tactic almost 
worked. Deprived of supplies, the English army was starving and about 
to return south when word reached them of the whereabouts of Scottish 
forces, and an English victory at the battle of Falkirk was the eventual 
outcome.35 The devastation of the Scottish south in anticipation of Eng-
lish invasions continued in the years to come, as did the removal of sheep 
and cattle to wooded or upland areas to deny the enemy easy access to 
such resources. Slash and burn tactics in anticipation of English invasions 
were, however, only part of the policy of destruction employed within 
Scotland during this time. For the ravaging of lands with fire and sword 
was also a regular tactic of Scottish forces within Scotland, as well as dur-
ing their regular raids into Northern England, or indeed their campaigns 
32 Original Letters Illustrative of English History, 3rd series, ed. Henry Ellis, 3 vols (London: 
Harding, Triphook and Lepard, 1846), i, 36; Rogers, Wars of Edward III, 49; Thomas Gray, 
Scalacronica, ed. A. King (Woodbridge: Surtees Society, 2005), 123.
33 Andrew Ayton, Knights and Warhorses: Military Service and the English Aristocracy under 
Edward III (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1999), 213–214.
34 Fiona Watson, “Sir William Wallace: What We Do – and Don’t – Know,” in The Wallace 
Book, ed. Edward J. Cowan (Edinburgh: John Donald, 2007), 26–41, at 34.
35 Fiona Watson, Under the Hammer: Edward I and Scotland, 1286–1307 (East Linton: Tuck-
well Press, 1998), 65–67.
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in Ireland.36 For the Anglo–Scottish wars were at various points also 
periods of civil conflict within Scotland between supporters of different 
claimants to the throne. Robert I of Scotland had won the kingdom to 
his rule as much at the point of the sword as he had through persuasion, 
and his destruction of territory in northeast Scotland was said by one 
chronicler to have reduced it to such utter devastation that people still 
spoke sorrowfully of it fifty years later.37 Taking into account chronicle 
hyperbole, it is undeniable that the Scots fought a war within Scotland 
that included the deliberate destruction of crops, spoliation of goods and 
ruination of land that was intended to force submission and allegiance to 
the Bruce regime. This was a war fought for the loyalty of the people of 
Scotland during a period when lordship over them was keenly contested. 
The lord who was able to devastate another’s lands demonstrated the 
weakness of he who currently possessed them. He was, after all, unable to 
look after his tenants and prevent such destruction. More than this, the 
lord who was capable of creating such devastation was also, by extension, 
also powerful enough to prevent its repetition in future and was, there-
fore, a lord worth following.
This strategy continued during the Second War of Independence in 
a time where an alternative ruling dynasty was supported by Edward III 
of England, and the adult male representative of that dynasty (Edward 
Balliol) was actively campaigning in Scotland. The already-discussed 
Andrew Murray was to the fore in meting out devastating punish-
ment against the territories of those who supported the other side, or 
those who wavered in their allegiance. As already stated, he targeted 
northeast Scotland in 1336 as soon as Edward III had departed the 
area, devastating the region to reassert the continued reality of Bruce 
36 For Scottish raiding of Northern England and Ireland, see Colm McNamee, The Wars of the 
Bruces: Scotland, England and Ireland, 1306–1328 (East Linton: Tuckwell Press, 1997), chapters 
3 and 5.
37 Barbour, The Bruce, 332–334. The “herschip” of Buchan, as this event was called, witnessed 
the particularly violent devastation of lands that belonged to Bruce’s enemies, the Comyn fam-
ily. The actions of Robert I’s forces in the region, where they “[burned] all Buchan from end 
to end, sparing none,” was undoubtedly intended to live long in the memory and served as an 
object lesson to others of the dangers of non-submission.    
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dominance.38 The results of this devastation are outlined by one chroni-
cler who commented that “by the continual depredations of both sides 
the whole land of Gowrie, Angus and the Mearns was reduced to almost 
irredeemable devastation and extreme poverty.”39 Other regions, such as 
south-west and south-east Scotland, respectively supporters of the alter-
nate regime and territory conquered by the English, were similarly vis-
ited repeatedly by attacking Scottish forces. The Scots used such raids to 
exact tribute and ransom from local people, and to reinforce the message 
that the Bruce regime remained active and militarily ascendant.40 All of 
this was a deliberate policy. It was intended to enforce submission to the 
Bruce regime. It was also to remind those who lived in Scotland that, 
while English armies could traverse through Scotland almost at will in 
the summer months, it was the Scots who remained during the rest of the 
year and who were able to enforce their lordship more consistently. This 
was a direct continuation of the war that Robert I had himself fought in 
the early years after his seizure of the throne. And while it has far more of 
a “shock and awe” approach to it than “winning hearts and minds,” it was 
the war that needed to be fought to ensure that the allegiance of the Scot-
tish people remained solidly with the Bruce regime. Medieval lordship 
had to be enforced. It had to be seen to be operating. As already indicated, 
the physical demonstration of strong lordship was an essential compo-
nent of the war being fought. This was a war fought for people’s loyalty, 
as much as it was fought over territory. And as such, the slash and burn 
approach worked well for the supporters of David II as an offensive tool, 
to be wielded against recalcitrant or wavering Scots, as much as it could 
be used as a defensive measure against invading English armies.
38 Iain A. MacInnes, “Shock and Awe:  The use of terror as a psychological weapon during the 
Bruce-Balliol Civil War, 1332–1338,” – England and Scotland in the Fourteenth Century: New 
Perspectives, ed. A. King and M. Penman (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2007), 40–59, at 
46–47.
39 Chron. Bower, vii, 115.
40 MacInnes, “Shock and Awe,” 43–49.
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Battle-seeking or battle-avoidance?
As for Bruce’s supposed instruction that the Scots always fight on foot, 
there can be little doubt that this referred to battlefield tactics. The Scots, 
when raiding Northern England and campaigning throughout Scotland, 
were based predominantly around fast-moving, mounted forces. These 
allowed them to cover large distances on organised raids, dispensing 
damage and destruction against the countryside, but with little chance 
of being pinned down and forced into a confrontation.41 The Hainaulter 
chronicler, Jean le Bel, famously wrote of the Scots that,
when they mean to invade England their army will cover twenty or thirty 
leagues at a stretch, by day or night.  Anyone who didn’t know their 
ways might well be amazed. The fact is that when they invade they’re all 
mounted, except for the rabble who follow them on foot; their knights 
and squires ride good sturdy rounceys and the others little hackneys. 
And  because  of  the  mountainous  terrain  in  those  parts  they  have 
no  baggage train and carry no supplies of bread or wine…42
It was a form of warfare that the English would themselves take up dur-
ing the Hundred Years War in the tactic which became known as the 
chevauchée.43 This was the Scots’ main means of combating the Eng-
lish, as well as internal enemies, and cannot be aligned with the words 
of Robert I’s testament, where fighting on foot was stressed as the key 
element. 
This comment must, therefore, relate specifically to battlefield sce-
narios (including smaller-scale skirmishes and ambushes), with the spe-
cific adaptation of this point in later years to more explicitly stipulate that 
the Scots not fight the English in battle at all. As Buchanan had argued in 
the sixteenth century, the Scots should “never…bring their whole force 
against the English at once, nor risk their fortune on the issue of one 
41 Alastair J. Macdonald, “The Kingdom of Scotland at War, 1332–1488,” – A Military History 
of Scotland, ed. Edward M. Speirs, Jeremy A. Crang and Matthew J. Strickland (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 158–181, at 163–164.
42 Chron. Le Bel, 35–36.
43 Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp, 5–8.
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battle.”44 It appears clear, however, that this was not what was originally 
intended. The suggestion that the Scots fight on foot was nothing new. 
They had been doing so since at least the twelfth century.45 Although the 
Scottish cavalry arm did not fully disappear in the fourteenth century, 
the role of knights in battle changed as Scottish warfare followed broader 
medieval trends. Here the knights dismounted and fought as heavily 
armoured and heavily armed infantry, reinforced by missile troops and 
lesser-armoured foot.46 But Robert I’s supposed advice appears at first 
glance to have been of little assistance. For the Scots fought on foot in 
numerous fourteenth-century examples of catastrophic battlefield defeat. 
The battles of Dunbar (1296), Falkirk (1298), Dupplin Moor (1332), Hali-
don Hill (1333), Neville’s Cross (1346) and Homildon Hill (1402) provide 
apparently ample evidence of a basic Scottish inability to succeed in large-
scale pitched battles, whether they fought on foot or not. Indeed, such 
defeats appear to align with sixteenth-century and modern-day comment 
that the Scots should have learned not to fight large-scale battles against 
the English at all. 
Those sixteenth-century writers, and their modern successors, have 
benefited from hindsight in knowing what would happen in the battles 
that followed, and in being able to perceive longer-term patterns of 
defeat in such situations. The commanders of the Second Scottish War 
of Independence did not. They may be seen by some historians to have 
ignored the advice of Robert I and marched to their ultimate defeat at 
Dupplin Moor (1332), Halidon Hill (1333), and Neville’s Cross (1346).47 
But it is arguable that, instead of disregarding the lessons of the past, 
these men actually fought the battles that they did because they were fol-
lowing where their late king had led. There is no denying that the Scots 
fought in the post-1329 battles on foot, just as Robert I had supposedly 
44 Buchanan, History of Scotland, i, 444–445.
45 For Scottish warfare in this earlier period, see Matthew J. Strickland, “The Kings of Scots at 
War, c.1093–1286,” – A Military History of Scotland, 94–132.
46 See Michael Prestwich, “The Wars of Independence,” – A Military History of Scotland, 133–
157; MacInnes, Scotland Second War, chapter 2.
47 For detailed discussion of these three battles, see DeVries, Infantry Warfare, 112–128, 176–
187.
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instructed them. Even if his testament was a later creation, Robert I’s war-
time example was one where battles were shown to be of major impor-
tance. More than this they were battles that the Scots could, and indeed 
did win. Robert I’s success over the English at Bannockburn (1314), as 
well as smaller-scale victories at Loudon Hill (1307), Myton (1319) and 
Old Byland (1322), may have been interpreted as just the sort of template 
for battlefield success that the testament also purported to be for warfare 
more generally.48 That Robert I’s testament in its earliest form made no 
mention of battle avoidance should come as little surprise. Why would it? 
Robert I’s victories in battle showed up the myth of contemporary English 
battlefield dominance, and emphasised that success could be gained, as 
long as the conditions under which the battle was fought were advanta-
geous.
It is arguable that at least two of the three examples from the Second 
Scottish War of Independence fit this model of advantageous conditions. 
Dupplin Moor was a battle against a very much smaller invading Anglo–
Scottish force that lacked widespread support.49 The supporters of David 
II appear to have been organised in their planning to meet the invasion, 
and summoned two armies to meet a threat that was thoroughly antici-
pated. The invading forces met the northern army in battle, and so did 
not face the full extent of the Scottish military on the field. Still, the Bruce 
forces outnumbered their enemies to a large extent and appear to have 
fully expected to win at Dupplin.50 The Scottish defeat that followed was 
caused by a combination of Scottish overconfidence, a disorderly charge 
against a static English defensive line, and good tactics on the part of 
the invading forces that utilised the potent combination of archers and 
infantry.51 Neville’s Cross was fought by a young, energetic Scottish mon-
48 For modern discussion of Bannockburn and Loudon Hill, see DeVries, Infantry Warfare, 
66–85, 49–57. For medieval description of the battles of Myton and Old Byland, see Bruce 
(Duncan), 640–646, 684–694. For further examples of Scottish battlefield success, this time in 
Ireland, see McNamee, Wars of the Bruces, 166–205.  
49 MacInnes, Scotland’s Second War, 11–13.
50 DeVries, Infantry Warfare, 112–119.
51 Chron. Bower, vii, 77–79; The Chronicle of Lanercost 1272–1346, ed. H.E. Maxwell (Glasgow: 
James Maclehose & Sons, 1913), 269–271; Scalacronica (King), 109–111; The Brut or Chron-
icles of England, ed. F.W.D. Brie (London: Early English Text Society, 1906–1908), 276–279; 
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arch during a period when the English king, and the bulk of his army, 
was fighting in France. David II was also confident of battlefield success 
because the period immediately before had been one of increasing Scot-
tish military activity and accomplishment.52 The Scots even went into 
battle with new tactics, Scottish soldiers wearing improved head protec-
tion and lowering their heads when English archers fired upon them to 
ensure that they did not experience the same blinding effect from English 
arrows that they had suffered at previous defeats.53 There was, it could be 
argued, no better time to fight the English in battle.54 The eventual defeat 
outside Durham against a hastily-arrayed force from Northern England 
occurred in part as a result of the terrain, which broke up the Scottish 
attack, and the retreat of the Scottish rear division when it could have 
been brought to bear against the English, as well as the efficacy of the 
English longbow.
Halidon Hill was somewhat different. It was, at first glance, a battle 
that could have been avoided.55 Coming as it did as a result of an agree-
ment reached with the garrison of Berwick to surrender to Edward III 
if not relieved by a Scottish army in the field, the Scots could have cho-
sen to accept the loss of the town. That the battle occurred at all may 
be in part a result of the importance which Robert I himself placed 
on the retention of Berwick-upon-Tweed in Scottish hands. Its cap-
ture had been an important symbolic victory for Robert I, and its suc-
cessful defence against English siege had further enhanced the king’s 
Chronica Monasterii de Melsa, ed. E.A. Bond (London: Rolls Series, 1868), ii, 363–364; Johan-
nis de Fordun, Cronica Gentis Scotorum, ed. W.F. Skene (Edinburgh: Edmonston and Douglas, 
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53 The Chronicle of Geoffrey le Baker, trans. D. Preest, ed. R. Barber (Woodbridge: Boydell 
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55 DeVries, Infantry Warfare, 120–128.
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reputation.56 As the chief port of Scotland, it was also of prominent eco-
nomic value to the Scottish kingdom in its attempts to financially afford 
to continue the war with England. The fact that the Scottish Guardian, 
Archibald Douglas, like Robert I before him, could not countenance 
Berwick’s loss, and fought an ultimately unsuccessful battle to retain it, 
may have been as much a result of Robert I’s attitude towards the town 
as Douglas’s own.57 Even so, the Scots attempted to first draw away the 
English besiegers by means of a diversionary raid into Northern Eng-
land. When this did not work, they sought to take up a defensive posi-
tion and invite the English into attacking them. Such tactics could have 
proven successful, were it not for the reality that the Scots were forced by 
the siege agreement to attack the English or forfeit the town. As a result, 
Douglas surrendered his own defensible position and attacked a well-
positioned enemy, one that also utilised the same combination of archers 
and infantry that had been so devastatingly successful at Dupplin. 
The defeats of the Second War of Independence can, therefore, be 
seen as battles that were fought in imitation of Robert I’s own success and 
in response to his supposed advice, or at the least in imitation of his past 
actions. Dupplin Moor was fought to head off a possible takeover of the 
Scottish throne by an alternative claimant. It was fought against forces 
that were smaller in number and with the benefit of Scotland’s most 
recent battlefield experience having been a success. Neville’s Cross was 
fought against the hastily-arrayed forces of northern England, and was 
a battle that the Scottish commanders could have expected to win, just 
as they had previously against the local levies assembled against them at 
Myton. And although Halidon Hill was a battle that was somewhat forced 
upon the Scottish leadership, it remains that they likely had a numeri-
cal advantage, and attempted to manoeuvre the English forces in such a 
way as to negate their tactical advantage. Moreover, the defeat at Dup-
plin could have been considered something of an anomaly, considering 
its nature and the fact that it had been a battle that the Scots should have 
56 Penman, Robert the Bruce, 177–190, 206–210.
57 Chron. Lanercost (Maxwell), 279–280; Chron. Bower, vii, 93; Chron. Anonimalle, 1307 to 
1334, 163–169; Brut, 283–286; DeVries, Infantry Warfare, 120–128.
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won. In such examples, then, far from ignoring the lessons of Robert I, 
Scottish commanders may have been following quite closely what he had 
taught them, and indeed were seeking to repeat his victories. That these 
later commanders were ultimately unsuccessful has led to their actions 
being seen negatively. And while defeat or victory are the only real out-
comes with which to judge medieval battles, greater consideration of the 
wider context is required before contemporary commanders should be 
condemned in modern writing. At the very least, they were looking to 
continue periods of previous Scottish military success, and were attempt-
ing to learn from victory, rather than from defeat.
Conclusion
This article has, from necessity, only dealt briefly with the history of this 
period. A longer and more detailed analysis of the events of this conflict 
may provide further important points regarding the nature of the war 
fought at this time, and the extent to which the Scots, and indeed their 
English foes, learned lessons from their experience. What this article has 
tried to do is challenge what appear to be accepted views on this war 
and on those who took part in it. Individuals who were able to survive 
their experience of one battle, one siege or one campaign, were better 
placed to do so again in future, and Scottish leaders were similarly well-
placed to learn lessons from their experience and to implement changes 
of tactics and strategy as a result. That a number of Scottish leaders served 
militarily in the early years of the second war, having experienced success 
in battle in the first, suggests that there was less of an experience deficit 
than has previously been suggested. Far from being unable to learn les-
sons from past defeat, and to implement change to ensure future success, 
Scottish leaders were also arguably following forms of warfare that had 
been successful under the leadership of Robert I. They used Scotland’s 
topography to their best advantage to undermine and frustrate a more 
numerous foe. They used the tactics of devastation and destruction of 
Scotland’s landscape as both a defensive and offensive weapon of war, 
to deny supplies to the enemy and to ensure that the Bruce cause was 
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either supported or feared. They adopted the raid as a major form of 
offensive warfare and employed this successfully in various theatres. And 
they sought to reinforce these successes through fighting battles. That the 
examples presented here all resulted in Scottish battlefield defeat should 
not be allowed to obscure the overall military picture. To focus on battles 
as the defining military events of the period is misleading for the simple 
reason that battles were irregular events, and they were rarely decisive. By 
taking a different perspective towards this period of warfare, it is possible 
to suggest that the Second Scottish War of Independence was a period of 
Scottish accomplishment. Armed with the strategies and tactics of Robert 
I, the Scots were to a large extent successful in their prosecution of a war 
that resisted English attempts at conquest, rejected English overlordship 
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